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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARCO INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC. ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) Case No. 880517-CA 
vs. ) Priority Classification 
) 14(b) 
RICHARD M. SWAINf ) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under 78-2a~3(2)(J), Utah 
Code Annotated, 19 53 as amended. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from a final judgment entered in 
favor of Plaintiff-Respondent (hereinafter referred to as 
"Marco") by the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, Fourth 
Judicial District Court, relative to an action concerning a 
written contract wherein Marco sued to collect back an 
advance payment of money paid as required by the contract, 
and Defendant-Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Swain") 
countersued to offset damages he suffered by the breech of 
the contract by Marco. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court error in returning Plaintiff's 
advance payment where Plaintiff breeched the written 
agreement to buy scrap materials from Defendant and 
Defendant suffered damages as a result of the breech in an 
amount greater than the advanced payment? 
Was Swain's evidence on the amount of damages he 
suffered insufficient to sustain an offset against the 
advance payment he retained from Marco? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
U.C.A. 70A-2-204 and U.C.A. 70A-2-709(1)(b>(1980). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Proceedings Below 
This contract action was filed by Marco to recover an 
advance payment made by Marco to Swain under a written 
agreement (Exhibit No. 1) wherein Marco agreed to purchase a 
large quantity of scrap materials located in both Millard 
County, at Swain's scraping yard (hereinafter referred to as 
the "Utah Yard")f and at the Nevada Test Site, Mercury, 
Nevada (hereinafter referred to as the "Nevada Site"), from 
Swain. (Tr. pages 9-10.) The contract required that Marco 
pay Swain in advance. Marco failed to take all the material 
described in the agreement and filed this suit to recover 
his over-advancement of moneys. (R. page 110, Finding #9.) 
Swain counterclaimed-^or -an- of fset—representing his damages 
resulting from Marco not taking all the material. (R. pages 
1-7.) 
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The lower court found that even though Marco did not 
take substantial amounts of material described in the 
agreement, he was not obligated to do so and since he had 
paid $14,374.77 more than he had taken in material, he was 
entitled to recover that sum, plus interest and cost, from 
Swain. The court found that Swain1s evidence on his damages 
resulting from breech of contract was insufficient and his 
counterclaim was dismissed. (R. pages 114-119.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Marco is in the business of buying salvaged scrap 
metal materials and exporting to overseas markets. In the 
instant case, Marco was buying material to sell to a Taiwan 
Company, Choge Din Ent. Co., L.T.D. (hereinafter referred to 
as "Choge Din"). 
Swain is in the business of buying and salvaging scrap 
metal materials and reselling the same to buyers and 
consists of such materials as Marco purchased. Swain 
maintains a salvage yard in Millard County, Utah, but he 
also salvages material at other locations wherever he may 
buy material for salvage. 
On or about July 23, 1986, Swain bid on and purchased 
a large amount of salvage aluminum and copper coaxial wire 
located at the Nevada Site and sold by the U.S. Government. 
Swain was contacted by Mr. Klinn, a broker, who advised 
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Swain he had a buyer for the Nevada Site material and set up 
a meeting between Swain and Marco in Las Vegas, Nevada. A 
first meeting was held between Swain, Marco, Klinn and a 
representative from Choge Din. At the meeting samples were 
examined and the materials were discussed but no deal was 
made. Marco could not go onto the Nevada Site because of 
his non-citizen status so arrangements were made for him to 
visit the Utah Yard to view some of the Nevada Site material 
that had been hauled there by Swain. (Tr. pages 107-109.) 
(Tr. pages 6-12. ) 
On September 8, 1986, Marco met Swain at the Utah Yard 
and spent the better part of the day viewing materials. 
During the course of the day, the materials that had been 
hauled up from the Nevada Site and other quantities and 
types of scrap material Swain had on hand at the Utah Yard 
were examined. (Tr. pages 6-12.) 
The parties viewed quantities and types of materials 
Swain had on hand at the Utah Yard, talked price, and 
finally came to an agreement that was reduced to writing, 
setting forth a description of each type of material and 
price per pound. (See Exhibit No. 1.) Also in the written 
agreement the parties described the material to be taken 
from the Nevada Site and approximated the tonnage at 750,000 
pounds. The intent was that Marco would take all the 
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material meeting those descriptions from the Utah Yard and 
the Nevada Site that Swain had on hand. Marco failed to 
take any amount of several of the described items. The 
lower court found in Finding No. 9 and 11 (Record pages 
117-118)/ that the following materials were not taken by 
Marco: 
120/000 lbs. motors 5-1/2 cents/lb. 
44/000 lbs. synchronizer rings . . . 6 cents/lb. 
44/000 lbs. miscellaneous copper/ 
aluminum 11-1/2 cents/lb. 
82/000 lbs. electrical wire and 
coaxial 19 cents/lb. 
The court also found that Marco took 736/000 lbs. of 
material from the Nevada Site but failed to take 92/400 
pounds of the material from the Nevada Site. Swain had to 
haul that amount to Fillmoref Utah/ to remove it from the 
Nevada Site at an expense and loss to him. 
Marco took twenty-five (25) containers from the Nevada 
Site and five (5) containers from the Utah Yard. He was 
personally present when the containers were loaded in 
Fillmore. He admitted he did not take large quantities of 
the lower grade material that he had viewed and 'agreed to 
take per the September 8, 19 86 agreement. 
On November 14/ 19 86/ the parties met in Las Vegas. 
Marcos complained about the quality of material. They 
discussed a credit to offset or settle the complaint. Swain 
was willing to give a $4/000.00 credit if Marco would take 
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the rest of the material. Marco did not take any more 
material. Swain wrote Marco a letter, dated November 26, 
19 86, trying to get Marco to take the balance of the 
material. (Exhibit #6) Marco had his attorney. Earl R. 
Steen, write Swain a series of demand letters, demanding 
repayment and declaring the contract void. (Exhibit Nos. 
12, 13, 14, and 15.) Marco's advance payments amounted to 
$14,374.77 more than the value of the material that was 
taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The lower court errored in granting Marco 
judgment by returning his advance payment as Marco admitted 
he did not complete his contract to purchase scrap materials 
from Swain; where the court found as a fact that Marco did 
not take all the material he agreed to take; and where Swain 
presented competent evidence showing he suffered damages far 
in excess of the advance payment, which evidence was not 
disputed in any manner by Marco. 
2. The lower court errored in ruling that Swain's 
evidence on damages was insufficient. Swain testified from 
his own personal knowledge concerning the amount of material 
that was not taken and the reduced sales prices and values. 
He produced, by affidavit, the only written evidence he had 
concerning his resale of the material in mitigation of 
^6~ 
damages, the amount of material resold, and the sale prices 
of the resold items. The court errored in ruling Swain's 
evidence on damages was insufficient as Marco produced no 
evidence in rebuttal of the damages testified to by Swain. 
(R. 146) 
The lower court errored in not granting Swain judgment 
for the damages he sustained in the sum of $22,152.00, 
offsetting the advance payment of $14,374.77, for a net 
judgment in favor of Swain in the sum of $7,777.23, plus 
interest and court costs, where the court found that Marco 
had not taken all the material he agreed to take; Marco 
admitted he had not taken all the material; and Swain's 
evidence showed he suffered damages as a result of lower 
resale prices for the material not taken; and other special 
damages. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code on 
"Sales", U.C.A. 70A-2-204, are applicable to this case. 
"Formation in general." 
"(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in 
any manner sufficient to show agreement, including 
conduct by both parties which recognizes the 
existence of such a contract." 
"(3) Even though one or more terms are left open, 
a contract for sale does not fail for indefinite-
ness if the parties have intended to make a 
contract, and there is a reasonable certain basis 
for giving an appropriate remedy." 
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U.C.A. 70-A-2-204(1) is applicable because there is no 
question both parties intended to contract one with the 
other. Exhibit No. 1 was formally written and signed by 
both after extensive discussions and examinations. Even 
though quantity was not exactly stated, both parties 
examined the actual material to be included under the 
contract through their own trained eyes, and reduced their 
observations into descriptions. They then proceeded, but 
Plaintiff ceased performance before all the material was 
taken. 
U.C.A. 70A-2-204(3) is especially applicable because 
it provides that a contract does not fail for indefiniteness 
simply because a term is left open if the parties intended a 
contract and there is a reasonable basis for giving an 
appropriate remedy. 
In this case it was reasonable for the lower court to 
find that Marco was to take all of the aluminum coaxial and 
copper wire Swain was salvaging at the Nevada Site, 
including the balance of 92,400 lbs. which Swain had to haul 
to Fillmore at an expense to him. It was reasonable for the 
lower court to find that Marco was to take all the material 
Swain had at the Utah Yard meeting the descriptions cited in 
the contract. The lower court did not. 
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It was reasonable for the lower court to find damages 
in favor of Swain equal to his testimony, affidavit and 
documentation. U.C.A. 70A-2-709(1)(b)(1980) provides that 
the measure of damages when the buyer fails to pay the price 
when it becomes due is the price of "goods identified to the 
contract if the seller is unable after reasonable effort to 
resell them at a reasonable price..." 
In this case all the materials at the Nevada Site 
meeting the description were identified to the contract, and 
also all the material at the Utah Yard. Swain tried and 
succeeded in selling most of the material at reasonably good 
prices to E.D.S. Enterprises. He testified from personal 
knowledge concerning the weights and values of the materials 
that were left. Based on his experience in the business, he 
stated his opinion that the materials left after the sale to 
E.D.S. was one-half of what Marco had agreed to pay for 
them. Under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
Swain was entitled to his damages as a result of Marco's 
failure to complete the contract. Those damages were 
readily calculated, and the lower court errored in not 
granting Swain his damages in the form of a set-off and net 
judgment against Marco. 
The lower court held that the best evidence rule bound 
Swain's testimony and evidence on damages. The best 
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evidence rule does not so provide. The rule is set out in 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1001-1008. 
Rule 1001 provides that an original writing must 
generally be produced, if there is such a writing. But a 
writing is not required where a party seeks to prove a fact 
which has an existence independent of any writing. Roods 
v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982). 
In this case Swain produced the only written documents 
he had on the question of damages, mitigation and resale of 
some of the material. The original contract for the resale 
to E.D.S. was produced as evidence, via affidavit, allowed 
by the court. (See Record page 25.) The amount of material 
resold was produced on Swain's original notes. (Record page 
26.) These documents satisfied the best evidence rules. 
All other evidence on damages was produced independent of 
any documents, from Swain1s personal knowledge. (See 
Argument II below for references.) 
ARGUMENT II 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #1 is the handwritten contract 
entered into between the parties. It basically described an 
agreement between the parties for the sale and purchase of 
scrap material from two different locations, i.e. Swain's 
Utah Yard and also from the Nevada Site. The written 
agreement was prepared after several meetings and discus-
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sions between the parties. Marco had examined samples of 
the material from the Nevada Site. He had also examined all 
of the material in the Utah Yard. The parties had 
identified the subject matter of this contract and agreed 
upon a price per pound for the various items. 
Even though the contract did not specify the amount of 
material to be taken from the Utah Yard, the contract 
provided: 
"...also included is material at Swain's property 
in Utah." 
Following this phrase is a detailed description and price 
list of the various types of material. Swain testified that 
the parties intended to include all the scrap material he 
had at the Utah Yard. (Tr. page 106, lines 10-20.) 
At page 52 of the transcript of the trial, Marco was 
looking at Exhibit No. 1 and states that the list 
represented what he looked at in Swain1s yard and said in 
line 3: 
"Thank you. Yes, those are the materials in this 
yard at that moment." 
Marco then answered in the affirmative that he had seen each 
of the different described items. At page 53, lines 17-25, 
he stated he was looking at piles of material on the ground. 
On pages 54 and 55, Marco answered affirmatively that he was 
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agreeing to buy all the material he examined in the Utah 
Yard. At page 54, line 18/ the question was asked: -
"But was it clear in your mind that you were going 
to buy these materials that I have just read to 
you off of this list, you were going to buy those 
materials that you saw? 
Answer (line 21) by Marco: 
Yes. 
Question (line 24): 
Okay, and you agreed upon a price? 
Answer (line 25): 
Yes." 
On page 12 of the transcript, on direct examination, 
Marco told his attorney "everything" was included, when 
asked about quantity, line 25, Marco answered: 
"Oh. Everything, that took, we took a look there, 
and we inspect material, and we settle price..." 
Marco admitted on cross-examination that he did not take all 
of several of the items listed in the contract and none of 
some. 
At page 71 of the transcript, lines 18-21, Marco 
admitted he did not take all of the 40 or 50 thousand pounds 
of motors and bearings listed in the agreement, and none of 
the steel/brass synchronizers. Knowing that he had not 
taken all of the material listed in the agreement, at page 
82, lines 6-16, Marco admitted he had his attorney write a 
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letter, dated December 31, 1986, terminating the contract. 
Marco stated at page 82, lines 20-22, that he had not 
purchased any material from the Utah Yard, which was 
contrary to his written agreement and earlier testimony. 
From the contract and testimony of Marco on both 
direct and cross-examination it is clear that Marco was 
going to take all of the described material from the Nevada 
Site also. He did take most of it, but not all. The 
75 0,000 pounds was recited as an estimate, yet Marco knew he 
was to take at least that much material. At page 14 of the 
transcript, line 16, in answer to his counsel, Marco stated: 
"Just as to quantity, we could not get in to see. 
So just Mr. Swain, he talks about approximately 
750,000 pounds, the quantity. That's a quantity 
he told me, he told me, quote to me." 
At page 43, line 5, in response to his counsel's 
questions, Marco stated: 
"The coaxial, because of when the things happen, 
we understand we owed almost a finish all of the 
quantity he talked to me, he said 750,000 pounds. 
But we almost finished those quantities, yes, at 
that time." 
At page 76 of the transcript, Marco again admitted he 
knew he "almost" (but didn't) take all the material he was 
to take from the Nevada Site. 
At line 15 on cross-examination, the question is 
asked: 
"Question: Almost? 
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Answer: Yes, almost to finish. 
Question: But not all? 
Answer: I think thisf if even we bought one 
more container, the quantity already over the, 
over the quantity he give to me, is the closer 
amount." 
Marco knew he had not taken all the Nevada Site 
material, yet he wanted his advance deposit back and 
terminated the contract through his attorneys letters. (See 
Exhibit Nos. 12, 13, 14f and 15.) 
At pages 102-105 of the transcript, Swain testified 
that Marco was present when the five containers were loaded 
from the Utah Yard material on hand and that Marco directed 
the loading, wanting specific higher grade material, while 
his buyers were present. (Page 103, line 6.) 
Swain testified at page 104, line 3, that there was 
material left in the yard that Marco did not take. There 
were synchronizer rings, motors, and one container each of 
electrical and lowgrade wire. Marco wanted to then move 
back to the Nevada Site and then come back to the Utah Yard 
and finish. He never finished taking the material from 
either location. At page 105, line 20, Swain testified that 
two empty containers were hauled from Utah back to the 
Nevada Site and: 
"Answer: ...we hauled those back to Mercury to 
put coaxial on them and then he said that after we 
finished the test site, he would come back and 
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finish the material here. (Referring to the Utah 
Yard.) 
Question: Did he ever do that? 
Answer: No, Sir, he didn't." 
At pages 120 and 121 of the transcript, Swain 
testified that the 120,000 pounds of motors and copper 
bearings described in the contract were not taken at the 
5-1/2 cents per pound; that the 44,000 pounds of 
synchronizer rings and green generator motors at six cents a 
pound described in the contract were not taken; only part of 
the "electrical and electronics," "aluminum coaxial wire," 
and "miscellaneous copper and aluminum wire and connectors" 
were taken; and all the "gold" and "silver" and "telephone 
plugs" were taken. 
At page 122 of the transcript, Swain testified that 
there was 92,400 pounds of wire that was not taken by Marco 
from the Nevada Site which Swain had to haul to Utah in 
order .to complete his contract with the government at the 
Nevada Site. 
Following a series of objections and rulings on the 
grounds of "best evidence" (pages 134-140), while Swain was 
attempting to testify concerning the damages he suffered 
from Marco's failure to take all the material, the court 
allowed the parties to submit further evidence on damages by 
affidavit. (Tr. page 141, line 11.) 
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Swain then submitted additional evidence on damages, 
via affidavit and documents, which appear at the record, 
pages 66-71• Swain attempted to mitigate his damages by 
reselling some of the material to another scrap metal 
dealer, i.e. E.D.S. Enterprises. (R. page 25.) 
Swain's affidavit, page 66 of the record, states that 
the material he resold to E.D.S. was the same material 
similarly described in his agreement with Marco (Exhibit No. 
1 herein). In fact, the same descriptive words are used in 
both agreements, i.e.: 
Marcofs E.D.S. 
Agreement Agreement 
Aluminum coaxial and copper .21 cents .18 cents 
Electrical and electronics .19 cents .09 cents 
Motors and copper bearings .05-1/2 cents .02-1/2 cents 
In the "E.D.S." agreement, the prices are set out and 
they are less in each case than prices set out in th-e 
agreement with Marco: 
1. Three cents per pound less for the aluminum and 
coaxial and copper hauled up from the Nevada Site; 
2. Ten cents per pound less for the electrical and 
electornics located at the Utah Yard; and 
3. Three cents per pound less for the motors and 
copper bearings located at the Utah Yard. 
Swain's affidavit also establishes the amount of 
material under each description which was actually sold to 
E.D.S. at the reduced prices. He recorded the actual 
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weights sold to E.D.S. and they are set out on page 26 of 
the record. 
1. Aluminum coaxial and copper 
92,350 pounds at .18 cents/lb. 
2. Electrical and electronics 
84,360 lbs. at .09 cents/lb. 
3. Motors and copper bearings 
92,280 lbs. at .02-1/2 cents/lb. 
The damage on these items actually resold to E.D.S is 
easily calculated: 
.03 cents x 92,350 lbs. of aluminum 
coaxial and copper $ 2,770.50 
.10 cents x 84,360 lbs. of electrical 
and electronics 8,436.00 
.03 cents x 92,280 lbs. of motors and 
copper bearings 2,768.40 
TOTAL: $13,374.90 
Swain's affidavit and testimony (Tr. pages 101-146) 
shows that he had a balance of 27,72 0 lbs. of motors and 
copper bearings left, 44,000 lbs. of steel/brass 
synchronizer rings and green motors left, and 44,000 lbs. of 
miscellaneous copper and aluminum wire and connectors left. 
Swain testified that these materials are worth one-half of 
what Marco agreed to pay for the material. (Tr. page 143.) 
Swain's damages resulting from Marco's failure to take 
materials which were not resold and still on hand are 
calculated as follows: 
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21,120 lbs. at 2-1/4 cents/lb $ 623.70 
44,000 lbs. at 3 cents/lb $lf320.00 
44,000 lbs. at 5-3/4 cents/lb $2,530.00 
Finally, Swain testified that it cost him two cents 
per lb. to load the material from the Nevada Site that Marco 
did not take, and $1.00 per mile to haul it up to Fillmore, 
totaling $4,473.00. (Tr. pages 122-124.) 
Defendant's damages are summarized as follows: 
Loading and hauling of Nevada Site 
wire from Nevada to Fillmore $ 4,008.00 
Loss on sale of Nevada Site wire • . . 2,770.50 
Loss on sale of electrical wire 
from Utah Yard 8,200.00 
Loss on sale of motors and copper 
bearings 2,700.00 
Decreased value of motors on hand. . . 623.70 
Decreased value of synchronizer 
rings on hand 1,320.00 
Decreased value of miscellaneous 
wire on hand 2,530.00 
TOTAL DAMAGES: $22,152.20 
As a result, Defendant's net damages are calculated as 
follows: 
$22,152.20 
Less: 14,374.77 
$ 1,111.43 
CONCLUSION 
Judgment should be entered in favor of Defendant on 
his Counterclaim in said amount. Plaintiff's cause of 
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action, Count 1 of the Complaint, concerns the $14,374.77 
overpay- ment, which is not disputed by Defendant except for 
any connotation that it was the result of wrongdoing on the 
part of Defendant. It was not. The overpayment results 
from the scheme of advance payments agreed upon between the 
parties in the September 8th agreement. 
In fact, the overpayment proves the Plaintiff knew he 
had agreed to take more material than he had received. The 
overpayment resulted from the last cash transfer Plaintiff 
made on October 28, 1986. Thereafter, Plaintiff terminated 
the agreement and started demanding that Defendant return 
his money. (See Exhibit 12.) 
DATED this 2L-^ day of February, 1989. 
^DEXTBk £n AtiftERSON 
Attdrney^for Defendant-
Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Respondent's Attorney, 
Dallas H. Young, Jr., 48 North University Avenue, P.O. Box 
672, Provo, Utah 84603, postage prepaid, thiSc^Pf^6day of 
February, 1989. 
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